What the founding texts say, what a government review recorded — and where documented fact ends and analysis begins.
The organisational link is not this archive’s claim; it is the movement’s own. Article Two of the 1988 Hamas Covenant defines the movement as “one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.” The UK Government review recorded the same link from the other direction: “The Hamas founding charter claims they are the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Muslim Brotherhood treat them as such” (para. 14), noting that support for Hamas, “including in particular funding,” had been a priority for the movement’s international network.
Italy’s intelligence service documented the same mechanism in its own February 2025 report to Parliament — and named the actors it was describing: “Il terrorismo jihadista ha tratto nuova linfa dallo scoppio del conflitto tra Israele e Hamas […] Tramite una propaganda costruita ad arte, al Qaida e DAESH hanno sfruttato la crisi mediorientale per ispirare soprattutto i giovani […] a compiere attacchi.” Jihadist terrorism drew new lifeblood from the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict; through artfully constructed propaganda, al-Qaeda and DAESH exploited the Middle East crisis to inspire above all the young to carry out attacks. It records the doubling of attacks in Europe in 2024 against 2023 as the result.
Read that attribution exactly. DIS is describing al-Qaeda and Islamic State — not the Brotherhood-inspired current discussed in the paragraph above. It is independent evidence that the conflict drives recruitment for the organisations it names. It is not confirmation of the organisational link between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and this archive does not present it as one. Two separate findings, from two separate documents, kept separate.
A European service that does not read it that way. Switzerland’s Federal Intelligence Service, in Sicherheit Schweiz 2026, declines the framing above. Even after the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, it finds, the Middle East conflict “stellt … bei dschihadistisch radikalisierten Personen in der Schweiz und in Europa kein Leitmotiv dar” — it is not a guiding motive. It does fuel antisemitic actions, which abroad have twice ended in jihadist violence: against a Jewish community in Manchester on 2 October 2025, and a Hanukkah celebration in Sydney on 14 December 2025. The same report finds ideological motive receding behind fascination with violence and personal crisis, and that in Europe an initial suspicion of terrorism proves “immer öfter als falsch” — more and more often wrong. That source is in the register under Switzerland. It is printed here, beside the finding it qualifies rather than lower down the page, because services describing the same years do not agree with one another — and a register that showed only the agreeing ones would be worth less than one that shows the disagreement.
What stands on the documents: the conflict is being used for recruitment in Europe, and the documents say so in their own words — Italy’s service describes propaganda “costruita ad arte” built on the crisis, and the UK review records funding of Hamas as a priority of the Brotherhood’s international network. What does not stand is a ranking. Calling it their most effective engine would need a comparison across recruitment channels that no source in this register performs, so this archive does not make that claim. The further step — that attention is deliberately diverted to the conflict — is a claim about intent, and intent is harder still. Both are analysis. Neither is presented as fact.
Illustration generated by an AI image model. It depicts nothing real and documents nothing — the evidence on this site is the source register.