st.michel
Illustrative image: a wall of torn posters. AI-generated, not a photograph.

The conflict as a recruitment engine

What the founding texts say, what a government review recorded - and where documented fact ends and analysis begins.

On camera

Official recordings on this subject, on the publishers' own channels. Each opens at the publisher; nothing is hosted here.

Hamas states the organisational link itself: Article Two of its 1988 Covenant defines the movement as "one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine." The UK Government review recorded it from the other direction: "The Hamas founding charter claims they are the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Muslim Brotherhood treat them as such" (para. 14), noting that support for Hamas, "including in particular funding," had been a priority for the Brotherhood's international network.

In its February 2025 report to Parliament, Italy's intelligence service (DIS) named the actors it was describing: "Il terrorismo jihadista ha tratto nuova linfa dallo scoppio del conflitto tra Israele e Hamas [...] Tramite una propaganda costruita ad arte, al Qaida e DAESH hanno sfruttato la crisi mediorientale per ispirare soprattutto i giovani [...] a compiere attacchi." Jihadist terrorism drew new lifeblood from the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict; through artfully constructed propaganda, al-Qaeda and DAESH exploited the Middle East crisis to inspire above all the young to carry out attacks. It records the doubling of attacks in Europe in 2024 against 2023 as the result.

DIS is describing al-Qaeda and Islamic State, not the Brotherhood-inspired current discussed in the paragraph above. Its report is independent evidence that the conflict drives recruitment for the organisations it names. It does not confirm the organisational link between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and this archive does not use it that way.

One edition later, the same service words it more narrowly. Its report on 2025, transmitted to Parliament in March 2026, reads: "Con riferimento alla crisi di Gaza, nel 2025 sono stati numerosi gli appelli veicolati tramite la propaganda jihadista a condurre attacchi in Europa, specialmente contro quartieri ebraici e ambasciate 'ebraiche e crociate'." In 2025 there were numerous calls, conveyed through jihadist propaganda, to carry out attacks in Europe, especially against Jewish neighbourhoods and 'Jewish and crusader' embassies. That is calls in propaganda, not a count of attacks, and the report sets the crises among several overlapping factors of radicalisation ("facilitano il sovrapporsi di diversi fattori di radicalizzazione"). The sentence on the doubling of attacks was not found in the pages read of the 2026 edition (printed pp. 101-104; the other chapters were not read). Both editions are in the register.

Switzerland's Federal Intelligence Service declines the framing above. In Sicherheit Schweiz 2026 it finds that even after the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, the Middle East conflict "stellt ... bei dschihadistisch radikalisierten Personen in der Schweiz und in Europa kein Leitmotiv dar" - it is not a guiding motive. It does fuel antisemitic actions, which abroad have twice ended in jihadist violence: against a Jewish community in Manchester on 2 October 2025, and a Hanukkah celebration in Sydney on 14 December 2025. The report also finds ideological motive receding behind fascination with violence and personal crisis, and that in Europe an initial suspicion of terrorism proves "immer öfter als falsch" - more and more often wrong. It is in the register under Switzerland and printed here, beside the finding it qualifies, because services describing the same years disagree.

Marked as analysis - not documented fact

What stands on the documents: the conflict is being used for recruitment in Europe. Italy's service describes propaganda "costruita ad arte" built on the crisis, and the UK review records funding of Hamas as a priority of the Brotherhood's international network. What does not stand is a ranking. Calling it their most effective engine would need a comparison across recruitment channels that no source in this register performs, so this archive does not make that claim. The further step - that attention is deliberately diverted to the conflict - is a claim about intent, which is harder still to establish. Both are analysis.

Recruiting children

Who is being arrested is getting younger. Five official counts, each with what it does and does not include.

European Union, 2025: 108 of the 347 people arrested for jihadist terrorist offences were 18 or younger - nearly one in three.

Europol - Publications Office of the European Union
"Some of the foiled attacks were plotted by underage males, while 108 out of 347 individuals arrested in the context of jihadist terrorist offences were 18 or younger."
printed p. 27, Jihadist terrorism; footnote 36 on the same page: "15 out of 344 arrests reported by the Member States did not specify the age." | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, from the same source: "18 or younger" includes 18-year-olds, who are adults; footnote 36 counts on a base of 344 reported arrests, 15 of them without an age. The 347 is the Key Findings figure for jihadist arrests in the EU in 2025 (row europol-tesat-2026).

Austria, 2025: 85 juveniles among the suspects in Islamist extremism and terrorism cases - 31.3 percent, down from 43.6 percent the year before.

Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN), Bundesministerium fuer Inneres (Austria), 2026
"Insgesamt konnten 272 Tatverdächtige ausgeforscht und zur Anzeige gebracht werden (2024: 202). Dabei handelt es sich um 210 (77,2 Prozent) männliche und 62 (22,8 Prozent) weibliche Personen (2024: 118 männliche, 84 weibliche). Unter den Beschuldigten befinden sich 85 Jugendliche (2025: 31,3 Prozent; 2024: 88 bzw. 43,6 Prozent)."
English - our translation, unproofreadIn total 272 suspects were identified and reported (2024: 202): 210 (77.2 per cent) male and 62 (22.8 per cent) female (2024: 118 male, 84 female). Among the accused are 85 juveniles (2025: 31.3 per cent; 2024: 88, or 43.6 per cent).
printed p. 117 (PDF p. 118), section 2.5.5, which opens "im Phänomenbereich islamistischer Extremismus und Terrorismus insgesamt 306 Tathandlungen mit einer islamistischen/jihadistischen Motivlage" | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, from the same source: Suspects reported to prosecutors, not convictions, and extremism offences as well as terrorism. The share of juveniles fell (43.6% to 31.3%). Same report, printed p. 98: "Die Mehrheit der radikalisierten Minderjährigen und jungen Erwachsenen beteiligte sich auch 2025 hauptsächlich an der Verbreitung von Propaganda." The report's definition of "Jugendliche" (age band) was not checked.

France, 2025: 22 minors charged with a terrorist offence by the anti-terrorism prosecutor - a third of the proceedings it opened that year.

Ecole nationale de la magistrature (France, Ministry of Justice), 2026 (interview given after 1 June 2026)
"22 mineurs ont ainsi été mis en examen pour une infraction terroriste suivie par le PNAT en 2025. Ils représentent le tiers des procédures ouvertes en 2025 et 20% des personnes mises en examen au cours de cette année."
English - our translation, unproofread22 minors were thus charged (mis en examen) with a terrorist offence handled by the PNAT in 2025. They account for a third of the proceedings opened in 2025 and 20% of the persons charged that year.
interview, answer on minors (the words "e tiers des procédures ouvertes en 2025" are in bold in the HTML) | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, from the same source: The 22 covers all terrorist offences, not only jihadist ones (jihadism is "88% des procédures suivies" overall). The same answer states that most 2025 proceedings concern individuals "sans lien direct avec les organisations terroristes", self-inspired by online propaganda - which limits any organisational reading.

Great Britain, year to March 2026: 41 people aged 17 or under arrested for terrorism-related activity, all ideologies together.

Home Office (UK), accredited official statistics, 2026
"the proportion of terrorism-related arrests involving minors was lower in year ending March 2026 than at its recent peak: 41 individuals aged 17 and under were arrested, including one linked to supporting Palestine Action, with minors making up 17% of non-Palestine Action arrests (40 of 241) where the age is known, down from 19% in the year ending March 2025"
Key results (HTML release) | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, from the same source: Covers terrorism-related arrests of all ideologies; the release gives no ideology breakdown for arrests (only for persons in custody, of whom 58% were "categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views"). Arrest is not charge.

Spain, 2025: 47 juvenile proceedings at the national court, 20 of them for jihadist terrorism - slightly down from 50 the year before.

Fiscalia General del Estado, Spain
"En cuanto a los delitos competencia de la Sección de Menores de la Fiscalía de la Audiencia Nacional, en el año 2025 se han incoado 47 Diligencias Preliminares que han dado lugar a 32 Expedientes de Reforma; en el año 2024 se incoaron 50 Diligencias Preliminares frente a las 26 incoadas en 2023, y las 8 de 2022. Por tanto, en este ejercicio se constata un ligero descenso frente al año anterior, pero se mantienen cifras muy similares, contrastando con aquellas más bajas de ejercicios anteriores. Del total de Diligencias Preliminares incoadas, 20 corresponden a delitos de terrorismo de carácter yihadista, y el resto lo son por delitos de naturaleza sexual y lesiones cometidos en el extranjero. Bajo el control de ejecución de la Sección de Menores de la Fiscalía de la Audiencia Nacional constan actualmente 13 menores cumpliendo medidas de internamiento en régimen cerrado."
English - our translation, unproofreadAs for offences within the competence of the Juvenile Section of the Prosecutor's Office at the Audiencia Nacional, in 2025 47 Preliminary Proceedings were opened, giving rise to 32 Reform Files; in 2024 50 Preliminary Proceedings were opened, compared with 26 in 2023 and 8 in 2022. This year therefore shows a slight decrease from the previous year, but figures remain very similar, in contrast with the lower figures of earlier years. Of all the Preliminary Proceedings opened, 20 concern offences of jihadist terrorism, and the rest are sexual offences and assaults committed abroad. Under the enforcement supervision of the Juvenile Section of the Prosecutor's Office at the Audiencia Nacional there are currently 13 minors serving closed-regime custodial measures.
Chapter III, 6.2 (Actividad en materia de responsabilidad penal de los menores), AN juvenile section paragraph | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, in the same passage: a slight decrease from 2024, and fewer than half of the 47 proceedings (20) concern jihadist terrorism. Spain's National Security Report for 2025 describes an increasingly young profile among those arrested, "incluyendo individuos menores de edad" (row es-dsn-iasn-2025-terrorismo).

Do the services agree?

Analysis - our reading of six reports in the register below. The lines are our summaries and translations, not quotations.

Verified sources - recruitment

Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findingsgovernment-review2015United Kingdomverbatim quote
UK Government (HC 679, House of Commons)
"aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security."
para. 39; see also paras. 14, 17-18 | verified 2026-08-05
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Article Twomovement-own-text1988Europe-wideverbatim quote
Hamas founding charter, 18 August 1988 - hosted by the Avalon Project, Yale Law School
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine."
Article Two | verified 2026-08-05
Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica (DIS), Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Italy - presented by Sottosegretario Alfredo Mantovano; transmitted to Parliament 28 February 2025
"Il terrorismo jihadista ha tratto nuova linfa dallo scoppio del conflitto tra Israele e Hamas e dall'effetto domino che ne è derivato. Tramite una propaganda costruita ad arte, al Qaida e DAESH hanno sfruttato la crisi mediorientale per ispirare soprattutto i giovani [...] a compiere attacchi. In questo deve essere letto il raddoppio degli attentati compiuti in Europa nel 2024, raddoppiati rispetto al 2023."
"Il terrorismo jihadista", p. 14 (printed header pagination; internal p. 10) | verified 2026-08-13
Italy's intelligence service states, unprompted, the conflict-as-recruitment-engine thesis this archive documents elsewhere, in its annual report to Parliament. It also names ISKP as the principal vector of the global jihadist threat in 2024, and the same chapter records the 31 May 2024 anti-Islam Pax Europa attack in Mannheim, Germany. The 2026 edition (row it-dis-relazione-2026) words the Gaza point more cautiously: appeals circulated in jihadist propaganda, not a count of attacks.
National Threat Assessment 2026security-service-report2026Norwayverbatim quote
PST - Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste (Norwegian Police Security Service)
"PST assesses there is an even chance that Islamist extremists will attempt to carry out terrorist attacks in Norway in 2026. [...] In the West, particularly in Europe, the level of terrorist activity by Islamist extremists has increased considerably following Hamas' terrorist attack on 7 October 2023 and Israel's subsequent military operation in Gaza."
"The threat from Islamist extremism", printed pp. 32-33 (PDF p. 17) | verified 2026-08-15
PST assesses right-wing extremism at the same level, in the same words: "PST assesses there is an even chance that right-wing extremists will attempt to carry out terrorist attacks in Norway in 2026" (printed pp. 38-39). The chapter that introduces both states its own scope: "This chapter focuses on the most serious threats from politically motivated violence in Norway: Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism." PST draws the same distinction this archive draws: "Their interpretation of Islam, and how it should be practised, differs from that of the majority of Muslims in Norway" - and records that the threat "persists, despite few people in Norway supporting them." The organisations PST names are the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. It makes no claim about the Muslim Brotherhood, and this row must not be read as one.
Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN), Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria)
"Die höchste Gefährdungslage im vergangenen Jahr ging vom islamistischen Terrorismus aus. [...] Der islamistische Extremismus war aufgrund der anhaltenden Attraktivität einzelner terroristischer Gruppierungen, der Zunahme von Aktivitäten im digitalen Raum innerhalb der letzten Jahre und der Mobilisierung durch Ereignisse wie den 7. Oktober 2023 ein zentraler Risikofaktor. [...] Der terroristische Angriff der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober 2023 und die darauffolgende Eskalation des Nahostkonfliktes war auch im Jahr 2025 ein zentraler Faktor für das Fortbestehen der Bedrohungslage in Österreich und Europa. Die Geschehnisse im Nahen Osten entfalteten weiterhin eine stark emotionalisierende Wirkung und beförderten bzw. stärkten islamistische Rekrutierungs- und Mobilisierungspotenziale. Terrororganisationen wie der Islamische Staat nutzten diese Thematik propagandistisch und riefen zu Terroranschlägen - unter anderem in Österreich und Europa - auf."
English - our translation, unproofreadThe highest threat level in the past year emanated from Islamist terrorism. [...] Islamist extremism was a central risk factor owing to the continuing attractiveness of individual terrorist groups, the increase of activities in the digital space within recent years, and mobilisation through events such as 7 October 2023. [...] The terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent escalation of the Middle East conflict was, in 2025 as well, a central factor in the continuation of the threat situation in Austria and Europe. Developments in the Middle East continued to have a strongly emotionalising effect and promoted or strengthened Islamist recruitment and mobilisation potentials. Terrorist organisations such as Islamic State exploited this theme for propaganda and called for terrorist attacks - including in Austria and Europe.
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2025, printed p. 8 and p. 98; gaps marked [...] | verified 2026-10-04
Counter-evidence (same report): the DSN director places Islamist terrorism at the top of the 2025 threat level but, in the paragraph that follows in the same foreword, says both LEFT- and RIGHT-wing extremism 'became further entrenched'; the report records 1,986 right-wing-category acts (+33.6%) against 306 Islamist/jihadist acts (+42.3%) - different category definitions, not like-for-like, and the right-wing category bundles xenophobic/racist, Islamophobic, antisemitic and unspecific acts - and 136 left-wing acts (2024: 214). The Islamist organisation named in the quoted passage is Islamic State; the passage on Hamas is about Hamas members storing firearms and must not be read as a finding about any other organisation.
National Terrorism Threat Assessment 2026security-service-report2026Finlandverbatim quote
Supo - Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Suojelupoliisi)
"The threat level of terrorism in Finland stands at level three, elevated, on a five-point scale. [...] The most likely threat of a terrorist attack comes from lone operators and small groups advocating radical Islamist or far-right ideologies. [...] The war in Gaza has mobilised and radicalised individuals and networks supporting radical Islamist ideologies. The international terrorist organisations ISIL and al-Qaeda and the groups that swear allegiance to them have also sought to exploit the conflict in their propaganda and called for attacks in the West."
Supo web page (English edition), opening paragraphs and the section on radical Islamist terrorism; gaps marked [...] | verified 2026-10-04
Counter-evidence (same page): Supo names radical Islamist AND far-right ideologies together as the most likely source of attacks; says the youth threat from extreme-right supporters 'has increased' while organised right-wing extremism 'does not pose a direct threat of terrorism'; rates extreme-left terrorism 'low' with signs of more violence and sabotage tied to the Palestinian question; says 'a large-scale attack in Finland remains unlikely'. The Islamist organisations named are ISIL and al-Qaeda. The Muslim Brotherhood is NOT mentioned (0 hits in the English text; control: 'ISIL' 3 hits). The scale is 'level three of five'; an earlier Finnish edition (seen only as a search-result snippet, not opened) used a four-level scale, so a bare 'elevated' must always carry its scale. Provenance: supo.fi sits behind a bot challenge that this archive does not bypass, so the text was read in the Internet Archive's capture of 11 March 2026 of Supo's own English page (the link). Official page: supo.fi/en/national-terrorism-threat-assessment-2026.
Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland juni 2026 (DTN)security-service-report2026Netherlandsverbatim quote
NCTV - Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (Netherlands), 30 June 2026
"Er is in Nederland nog steeds sprake van een substantiële terroristische dreiging. Het dreigingsniveau blijft daarom gehandhaafd op niveau 4 op een schaal van 5. Dat betekent dat er een reële kans is dat er in Nederland een aanslag zal plaatsvinden. De jihadistische dreiging blijft het meest bepalend voor de terroristische dreiging. Getuige diverse arrestaties het afgelopen jaar zien jihadisten Nederland nog steeds als doelwit."
English - our translation, unproofreadThere is still a substantial terrorist threat in the Netherlands. The threat level is therefore maintained at level 4 on a scale of 5. That means there is a real chance that an attack will take place in the Netherlands. The jihadist threat remains the most decisive for the terrorist threat. As evidenced by various arrests over the past year, jihadists still see the Netherlands as a target.
"Dreigingsniveau", p. 3 | verified 2026-10-04
Same report: the jihadist threat is attributed mainly to ISIS (p. 3); the Muslim Brotherhood is not named anywhere in the document (0 hits; control: 'Hamas' on 5 pages). Jihadist attacks in Europe in the past half-year were relatively limited, the threat from ISIS transnational networks decreased, right-wing terrorist and anti-institutional threats are unchanged, and the raised attack probability is tied to the war around Iran and (semi-)state involvement. The Hamas sentence concerns Hamas, not the Brotherhood as a movement.
Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica (DIS), Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Italy - presented by Sottosegretario Alfredo Mantovano; transmitted to the Presidency 3 March 2026; presented 4 March 2026
"Con riferimento alla crisi di Gaza, nel 2025 sono stati numerosi gli appelli veicolati tramite la propaganda jihadista a condurre attacchi in Europa, specialmente contro quartieri ebraici e ambasciate 'ebraiche e crociate'."
English - our translation, unproofreadWith reference to the Gaza crisis, in 2025 there were numerous calls, conveyed through jihadist propaganda, to carry out attacks in Europe, especially against Jewish neighbourhoods and 'Jewish and crusader' embassies.
ch. 7 "Crisi internazionali e minaccia terroristica", printed p. 103 (PDF p. 115) | verified 2026-10-04
The 2026 edition is more hedged than the 2025 one the register quotes: in the pages read it speaks of appeals circulated in jihadist propaganda, not of a count of attacks, and frames the crises as one of several overlapping radicalisation factors. The same page (our summary) names the Manchester (Heaton Park) and Bondi Beach attacks as terrorist attacks with a clear antisemitic matrix, and names DAESH, Al-Qa'ida, ISKP and AQIS on p. 104. 'Fratellanza/Fratelli musulmani' returns 0 hits in the (partly garbled) text layer (control: 'jihad' 22 hits). Only printed pp. 101-104 were read; other chapters (domestic extremism) were not.
DPI Annual Report: New Islamist Identity Models as a Challengestate-documentation-fund2026Austria | Europe-wideverbatim quote
Documentation Centre Political Islam (DPI), Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Political Extremism - press page of 10 Sep 2026
"Another actor whose influence extends to Europe is Hamas, which was founded in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not only a terrorist organization designated as such in Europe and an armed group, but also a political party and a charitable organization. The Islamist group uses its dual structure - religious and charitable activities - to gain a foothold in European countries and to conceal its military operations. In this context, Europe has become a venue for fundraising, recruitment, propaganda, and operational preparations."
section "Europe as a Arena for Governmental and Non-Governmental Actors" (heading as printed) | verified 2026-10-04
This is the DPI's own press page for its own report, by a state-created documentation fund - not an independent finding (see row dpi-austria-mandate). The annual report itself was not opened (no PDF link on the page). The page's claim about the edit history of a Wikipedia article is the DPI's and was not checked. It states the Brotherhood 'is listed as a terrorist organization in some countries', not everywhere.
Säkerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Service), 9 January 2026
"The Head of the Swedish Security Service has decided that the terrorist threat level will remain elevated (level three on a five-level scale)."
first paragraph | verified 2026-10-04
Same release: "The threat mainly originates from violent Islamism and violent right-wing extremism. In Sweden, violent Islamism mainly consists of facilitation activities in the form of radicalisation, recruitment, and financing." The service sees focus shifting to violence itself rather than ideology, calls Russia the greatest threat to Sweden, and traces the intent to attack to 'a specific event or circumstance, either real or perceived' (generic, not the Middle East by name).
Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna 2025 (RASI 2025)government-review2026Portugalverbatim quote
Sistema de Segurança Interna - Secretária-Geral (Portugal); the quoted chapter is sourced to the intelligence services (SIRP)
"A conflitualidade no Médio Oriente, sobretudo no caso da guerra Israel-Irão, continuou a gerar desafios e riscos à segurança do abastecimento energético europeu e nacional. As tensões e conflitos na região continuaram, igualmente, a potenciar narrativas de radicalização, habilmente desenvolvidas e exploradas pelas organizações Al-Qaida (AQ) e Estado Islâmico (EI), integrando, assim, a gama de fatores motivacionais de ações violentas, na forma projetada e concretizada, na Europa e noutras geografias. [...] Dez anos após os atentados de Paris, a ameaça terrorista de matriz islamista constitui-se como uma das ameaças mais significativas à segurança interna e ao espaço europeu. O Estado Islâmico (EI) continua a ser a organização terrorista com maior capacidade de radicalização e projeção operacional em território europeu."
English - our translation, unproofreadConflict in the Middle East, above all the Israel-Iran war, continued to generate challenges and risks for the security of European and national energy supply. The tensions and conflicts in the region also continued to fuel narratives of radicalisation, skilfully developed and exploited by the organisations Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State (IS), thereby forming part of the range of motivating factors for violent acts, as planned and carried out in Europe and in other geographies. [...] Ten years after the Paris attacks, the terrorist threat of Islamist matrix is one of the most significant threats to internal security and to the European area. Islamic State (IS) remains the terrorist organisation with the greatest capacity for radicalisation and operational projection on European territory.
RASI 2025, printed p. 26 and pp. 31-32 (ch. 1.1); gap marked [...] | verified 2026-10-04
Counter-evidence (same report): the same chapter calls the radical and violent EXTREME RIGHT the 'predominant vector' of politically motivated violence in the Euro-Atlantic area and records a Portuguese right-wing group dismantled on terrorism-related charges; it states no Islamist attack has hit Portugal up to 2025 and that no recruitment for terrorist organisations or attack planning was detected on national territory; terrorism-related crime fell 29.4% and is described as residual in number. The organisations named on the Islamist side are Al-Qaeda and Islamic State; the Muslim Brotherhood is not mentioned (0 hits for 'Irmandade' / 'Irmãos Mu...'; control: 'terroris' 116 hits in the same text).
Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DSN), Gabinete de la Presidencia del Gobierno, Spain, for the Consejo de Seguridad Nacional; edition dated April 2026, PDF created 13 May 2026
"En este contexto, España continúa enfrentándose a la amenaza terrorista de ideología yihadista, marcada principalmente por la potencial actuación de actores solitarios autorradicalizados que, según las detenciones practicadas en el último año presentan un perfil progresivamente más joven, incluyendo individuos menores de edad. [...] España, durante el 2025, ha mantenido su Nivel de Amenaza Antiterrorista en un grado 4 de 5."
English - our translation, unproofreadIn this context, Spain continues to face the terrorist threat of jihadist ideology, marked mainly by the potential action of self-radicalised lone actors who, according to the arrests made in the last year, show a progressively younger profile, including minors. [...] Spain, during 2025, maintained its Anti-Terrorist Threat Level at grade 4 of 5.
Chapter "Terrorismo y radicalizacion violenta", printed p. 43 (PDF p. 43) | verified 2026-10-04
LIMITS, in the same chapter: p. 48 says those detained in Europe share "una limitada formación religiosa, escaso o nulo vínculo previo con organizaciones terroristas" (limited religious formation and little or no prior link to terrorist organisations); p. 52 rates non-jihadist violent extremism in Spain as rising "aunque alejada del marco de muchos países europeos" (though far from the picture in many European countries); p. 53 records the first operation against the far-right accelerationist group The Base. Figure 2.7 (73 operations, 113 detainees) includes operations abroad; it is not a Spain-only count.
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Germany)
"Auch der Blick auf das zweite Feld - den internationalen Terrorismus - zeigt anhaltend hohe Gefahren. Internationale Konfliktregionen beeinflussen weiter durch Emotionalisierungs-Effekte die Sicherheitslage in Deutschland - und befeuern insbesondere Gewaltbereitschaft gegen jüdische sowie israelische Einrichtungen. Ich erinnere nur an die Gruppierung HAYI, die sich im März und April zu mehreren Brandanschlägen auf größtenteils jüdische Einrichtungen in Deutschland und Europa bekannte. Auch hier müssen wir die Beeinflussung und mögliche Verbindung staatlicher, nicht-staatlicher und krimineller Akteure stark im Blick behalten. Daneben setzt sich bei sehr jungen Zielpersonen im Jihadismus der gefährliche Trend einer schlichten Glorifizierung von Gewalt fort, wobei komplexe ideologische Dogmatik zunehmend entbehrlich wird."
English - our translation, unproofreadA look at the second field - international terrorism - also shows persistently high dangers. International conflict regions continue to influence the security situation in Germany through emotionalisation effects - and fuel in particular a readiness for violence against Jewish and Israeli institutions. I recall only the grouping HAYI, which in March and April claimed responsibility for several arson attacks on mostly Jewish institutions in Germany and Europe. Here too we must keep a close eye on the influence and possible connection of state, non-state and criminal actors. In addition, among very young target persons in jihadism the dangerous trend of a plain glorification of violence continues, with complex ideological dogma becoming increasingly dispensable.
Opening statement of 5 October 2026 to the Bundestag's Parliamentary Oversight Panel, passage on the second priority field (international terrorism), five consecutive sentences | verified 2026-10-11
LIMITS: a short opening statement to a parliamentary hearing ("Es gilt das gesprochene Wort!"), with no figures. Most of it is about Russian hybrid attacks, which the president of the service puts first of three priority fields; international terrorism is the second. The statement does not use the word Islamism, and the only organisations it names are the group HAYI and, in a list of arrests, HAMAS operatives; for HAYI it says possible links between state, non-state and criminal actors must be watched. It says the same pattern of very young, violence-prone actors is found "simultan im gewaltorientieren Extremismus", with anti-CSD events given as an example beside demonstrations about the Middle East conflict. The remark that ideological dogma is becoming dispensable cuts against reading these cases as driven by doctrine.
Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste (PST), Norwegian Police Security Service; document dated 14 October 2026, published 15 October 2026
"PST har derfor sett nærmere på om lag 70 mindreårige, som vi har jobbet med i perioden 01.01.2023 til 01.01.2026, basert på en bekymring knyttet til ekstrem islamisme. [...] IS var den organisasjonen de fleste hadde vist interesse for, etterfulgt av al-Qaida."
English - our translation, unproofreadPST has therefore looked more closely at about 70 minors whom we worked on in the period 01.01.2023 to 01.01.2026, based on a concern related to extreme Islamism. [...] IS was the organisation most had shown interest in, followed by al-Qaida.
p. 4 (Innledning, first paragraph) and p. 7 (section on the minors' weak ideological conviction, last sentence) of the 15-page PDF | verified 2026-10-18
LIMITS: the same report says most of the minors (72 %) were assessed as having a weak or absent ideological conviction, that for some of them the concern about extreme Islamist ideology was dropped, and that some threats about IS turned out to be nonsense. It calls the group relatively small and says PST does not know all radicalised minors (p. 4); 44 % were not followed up with preventive measures because no basis was found, and the concern was reduced for relatively many (p. 13). What drove several of the minors was not known (p. 7). Interest in IS is not membership. PST's own landing page adds: "Det er viktig å understreke at disse kjennetegnene ikke gjelder alle muslimer, men en liten gruppe ekstreme islamister." ("It is important to stress that these characteristics do not apply to all Muslims, but to a small group of extreme Islamists.") The report's background figures on the minors' families and health are not reproduced here.

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