Three more governments, reporting separately
Italy, Belgium and Spain joined this archive in the past two days. None of the three cites the others: different services wrote them, in three languages, to three different parliaments and publics.
Italy documents the mechanism - and names different actors
The recruitment section of this site argues that the conflict works as a recruitment engine in Europe. Italy's intelligence service describes that mechanism in its own report to Parliament - and names whom it is describing:
"Il terrorismo jihadista ha tratto nuova linfa dallo scoppio del
conflitto tra Israele e Hamas e dall'effetto domino che ne è derivato. Tramite una
propaganda costruita ad arte, al Qaida e DAESH hanno sfruttato la crisi mediorientale per
ispirare soprattutto i giovani [...] a compiere attacchi."
DIS, Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione per la sicurezza (Anno 2024), p. 14 - (our translation) Jihadist terrorism drew new lifeblood from the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict and the domino effect that followed. Through artfully constructed propaganda, al-Qaeda and DAESH exploited the Middle East crisis to inspire above all the young [...] to carry out attacks.
The report puts a number on it: attacks carried out in Europe doubled from 2023 to 2024. The attackers were mostly under thirty, some of them minors, and mostly used knives rather than firearms or explosives.
The actors DIS names are al-Qaeda and Islamic State, not the Brotherhood-inspired current that the United Kingdom and France examined, and this post keeps the two subjects apart. Italy adds independent evidence for the mechanism: the conflict is being worked, deliberately and through constructed propaganda, to produce attacks in Europe. It adds nothing on who is linked to whom, and we do not stretch it that far.
An earlier version of this post carried the heading "Italy states the thesis this archive documents" and did not name al-Qaeda and DAESH in the surrounding text. That framing let a report about two proscribed terrorist organisations read as confirmation of a claim about a different movement. Corrected 2026-08-14, before publication. The accuracy and corrections page explains how we log these.
Belgium counts who was targeted
Belgium's threat-assessment body received 287 threat reports in 2024, 213 of them within its remit. On who those threats were aimed at, the report says:
"Throughout the year 2024, the general threat level 3 (serious) was in effect in Belgium. [...] Jewish and the Israeli interests were the main target, followed by specific persons."
CUTA, Annual Report 2024, p. 4
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency found that 96% of Jewish respondents encountered antisemitism in the year before its survey. The two instruments approach it from opposite ends: one counts warnings to a security service, the other asks the people concerned what they lived through.
Spain shows the mechanism in operation
Spain contributes something the other two do not: a count of enforcement rather than of threat. Its intelligence centre against terrorism and organised crime became, in April 2023, the first body in any European country to use the takedown powers under EU Regulation 2021/784.
"El Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen
Organizado (CITCO) del Ministerio del Interior emitió 134 órdenes de retirada de contenidos
terroristas en redes sociales entre los años 2023 y 2024 [...] el 65 por ciento corresponde a
informaciones relacionadas con la propaganda yihadista."
La Moncloa, 24 July 2025 - 134 takedown orders across 2023-24, 65% of them jihadist propaganda; the rest ultranationalist, racist or xenophobic material.
The same body, under the same regulation, aimed roughly a third of its orders at violent extremism of an entirely different kind.
What cuts the other way
Belgium's own report, in the pages quoted above, records that right-wing extremism was the second-largest category in its threat database, and that left-wing extremist activity rose over the same Gaza conflict - though, it notes, without real acts of violence. Belgium had no terrorist attack on its territory in 2024.
It is part of what the document says: a reader who checks our citation finds it in the first two pages, and leaving it for them to discover would earn the suspicion.
Why independence is the argument
Any one government report can be dismissed as politics. That dismissal gets harder when five states document the subject independently, in five languages, under governments of different political colours, without citing one another.
Independence only counts if the findings are described accurately. The United Kingdom (2015) and France (2025) examined the same movement - the Muslim Brotherhood and its European networks - and reached findings that rhyme, each with its own stated limits. Italy (2025) documents a different set of actors, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, working the same conflict for recruitment. Belgium (2024) and Spain (2025) contribute measurement rather than characterisation: who was threatened, and what was taken down. Stacking the five into a single claim is the move this archive exists to refuse.
It is also why this archive quotes their limits as carefully as their conclusions. France recorded that no recent document shows an intent by Musulmans de France to establish an Islamic state there, and that the threat it identified does not resort to violent action. Sweden lowered its national threat level in the same period others held theirs. Belgium logged a year with no attack. The same services wrote those sentences, and the register carries them too.